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Abstract 
 
Scholars and policymakers have devoted much attention to issues of 
third party intervention in conflict. The present paper considers a 
conflict that draws two countervailing outside interveners. As in the 
realist perspective, the outside parties are drawn to intervene through 
some economic or geostrategic interest that would be promoted 
through the victory of an ally. Using a simple game theoretic model, 
I find conditions under which outside interveners themselves fall 
prey to a Prisoner’s Dilemma outcome and become worse off 
through their own intervention. This result brings into further 
question the desirability of escalatory conflict intervention. The 
paper also studies conditions required for the United Nations, or 
some such supra-national institution, to prevent a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma outcome and successfully deter escalatory bilateral 
intervention. The findings show that the United Nations can alter the 
game equilibrium, and deter escalatory intervention, by imposing 
sufficient costs on intervening parties. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Biased intervention is often an important factor in the 
amplification of civil and international conflict. In biased 
intervention, outside parties typically attempt to improve the 
probability of success for an ally through military aid, (arms) 
subsidies, and direct military intervention. Many studies, such 
as those by Morgenthau (1967), Bull (1984), and Feste (1992), 
conclude that parties choose to intervene when national 
interests are at stake. Regan (1996, 1998) describes this view 
as the “paradigm of realism” and identifies it as the dominant 
philosophy in international politics. Complementary to realism 
is the idealist view that ethical issues and domestic politics 
play a crucial role in third-party decisions to intervene, a 
perspective supported by Blechman (1995), Carment and 
James (1995), and Dowty and Loescher (1996). Regan (1998) 
discusses the United States intervention in Bosnia as an 
example of domestic politics swaying a country's decision to 
intervene. He asserts that public outcry in the United States 
over failure to take action in Bosnia influenced the Clinton 
administration's policy. Similar examples exist in which an 
outside party does not intervene due to the high political cost 
of doing so. A strength of the realist perspective, taken in 
union with complementary views, is its recognition that 
national interest can derive from many disparate sources. In a 
paper addressing the history and nature of third-party 
intervention, Morgenthau (1967, p. 430) states, “All nations 
will continue to be guided in their decisions to intervene […] 
by what they regard as their respective national interests.” 
Thus, it is clear that realism views the interests of the third 
party as self-defined and potentially broad. In other words, 
success in a territorial conflict on the part of an “ally” can 
benefit the third party in a number of ways. Potential future 
benefits to the third party include enhanced access to natural 
resources and trade, improved national security, ethical 
fulfillment, and geo-strategic advantage (Moseley, 2006). A 
given conflict may draw two or more countervailing 
interveners. In some cases, such a conflict is termed a “proxy 
war.” During the 20th and early 21st centuries, proxy wars have 
been observed in Spain, Afghanistan, Angola, Korea, 
Vietnam, the Middle East, and Latin America. In cases of 
bilateral, escalatory intervention, outside parties that seek to 
decrease the cost of allied arming may greatly intensify a 
given conflict (Chang, Potter, and Sanders 2007). As the 
benefit of a conflict is essentially fixed or decreasing in 
conflict, the intensification of fighting by an intervening party 
is undesirable from human and welfare perspectives (Sanders 
2012). 
The present paper considers a conflict that draws two 
countervailing outside interveners. As in the realist 
perspective, the outside parties are drawn to intervene through 
some economic or geostrategic interest that would be 
promoted through the victory of an ally. Using a simple game 
theoretic model, I seek to determine whether such outside 
parties might themselves fall prey to a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
outcome and become worse off through their own 
intervention. This possibility has important policy 
implications. If intervention is rational in a strategic, marginal 
sense but unprofitable overall, then it may be feasible for a 
supra-national regulatory body (e.g., the United Nations) to 
simultaneously decrease escalatory conflict intervention and 
improve global welfare (e.g., by imposing the appropriate 
degree of targeted sanctions upon escalatory interveners). 
Political realists believe that a third party intervenes in a 
conflict in pursuit of its own national interests. On the other 
hand, idealists believe that outside intervention is motivated 
by humanitarian concerns. Several research findings show that 
conflict intervention tends to increase, rather than decrease, 
the duration of a conflict. Regan (1998) identifies realist 
interests as the leading factor in motivating conflict 
intervention. Using the Correlates of War data set, Regan 
(2002) tests several hypotheses related to the relationship 
between the timing and effectiveness of conflict intervention. 
He uses data on civil conflicts during the period 1944 through 
1999 to test those hypotheses using a hazard model. He 
concludes that third party interventions tend to widen the 
expected duration of a conflict rather than curtail it. 
Apparently in contrast to the findings of Regan (2002), Balch-
Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce (2008) use the Correlates of 
War data set to find that, while unilateral conflict intervention 
shortens conflict duration, bilateral intervention tends to 
increase the duration of conflict. These results, based on an 
analysis of 213 civil conflicts occurring between 1816 and 
1997, may not stand in contrast to the earlier results of Regan 
(2002). Regan’s aggregate finding may have been influenced 
by the effect of conflicts featuring bilateral intervention. 
Similarly, Siqueira (2003) investigates different scenarios 
under which military and or economic intervention might not 
help to achieve the desired goals targeted by policy makers. In 
order to select a right intervention strategy for reducing the 
conflict intensity, he suggests that the intervening third party 
should also take into account the indirect impacts resulting 
from the possible strategic interaction among the rival 
fractions. Chang, Potter, and Sanders (2007) develop a simple 
sequential-move game to illustrate the endogeneity of third-
party involvement in a conflict. Their model illustrates that an 
expected payoff maximizing party may intervene to generate 
peace or to disturb an existing peace depending on the feature 
of the conflict and the values maintained by the third party. 
Their conclusion is that third parties can be either “peace 
makers” or “peace breakers”. 
Little interest has been paid to the issue of third party 
welfare in conflict. Most prior work considers the welfare 
effects of third party intervention upon primary parties to 
conflict. However, it may be that outside intervention serves 
neither the primary parties in a conflict nor the interveners 
themselves. Intervening parties may often be locked in a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, whereby each is compelled by strategic 
forces to intervene. To study the potential for outside 
intervention as a Prisoner’s Dilemma type outcome, I consider 
a simple simultaneous intervention game between two 
potential interveners and derive conditions under which 
intervention follows as a Prisoner’s Dilemma outcome. 
Within the model, I also consider the role of the United 
Nations as conflict “meta-regulator.” The United Nations has 
the ability to sanction even (multiple) interveners to conflict 
and might use this mandate to end cases of Prisoner’s 
Dilemma type escalatory intervention. I derive conditions 
under which such effect on the part of the United Nations is 
possible and further note that the calculated effect, when 
applicable, has desirable humanitarian and Paretian properties. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
develops a conflict model of two outside intervening parties in 
a two stage game. I examine conditions under which two 
intervening parties may be locked in a prisoner’s dilemma. 
The paper also focuses on the conditions that determine the 
success of UN intervention in overcoming the dilemma 
scenario and preventing bilateral intervention. Section 3 
concludes the current research and discusses possible future 
research. 
2. Theoretical Model: A Simple Intervention Game 
 Our simple intervention game begins in the shadow of 
conflict. I consider two outside parties, each with a distinct 
ally among the two primary parties to conflict. Each outside 
party simultaneously considers whether to allocate a (fixed) 
positive amount of resources to intervene in a manner that 
improves its ally’s arms-related endowment or arms-related 
purchasing power (e.g., through arms subsidy, arms gifts, or 
direct military intervention). In either case, an outside party 
derives geostrategic and economic benefit if its ally wins 
control of the contested territory. This benefit may often 
derive from some characteristic of the aligned party. During 
the Cold War, for example, such a benefit may have been tied 
to the policies of containment and expansion. The United 
States valued the containment of Communism, and the Soviet 
Union valued the expansion of Communism to new territories. 
As another example, American Evangelicals regularly lobby 
in Washington D.C. for U.S. support of Israel. They do so in 
the belief that the existence of Israel as a Jewish state fulfills 
biblical prophecy. 
The simple intervention game is depicted in normal form 
below. Parties 1 and 2 represent outside intervening parties to 
conflict and are the focal point of the analysis. Implicit in the 
game are two primary parties in the shadow of conflict. 
 
Table 1: Simple Intervention Game in Normal Form 
 
In this table,          represents the probability that 
Party 1’s (Party 2’s) ally wins control of the contested region 
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where 1 = Party 1, 2 = Party 2, IN = Intervention 
if there is no intervention,    represents the (fixed) positive 
amount of intervention chosen by Party i,    is the economic 
value associated with one’s ally (preferred party) gaining 
control of the contested territory,   represents the unit cost of 
intervention, and 
  
   
 is the marginal effect of intervention 
efforts by Party 1 upon its allies likelihood of success. Note 
that the unit cost of intervention is normalized to one. It can be 
verified that this intervention game possesses a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma type Nash Equilibrium outcome if each of the 
following two conditions hold: 
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If the first inequality in each expression holds, then the 
(geostrategic) welfare of the two outside parties is lower in the 
case of mutual intervention, as compared to the case of no 
intervention. In other words, the strategy profile {intervention, 
intervention} is sub-optimal according to the first inequalities. 
I expect the first inequalities for each expression to hold if the 
two outside parties are sufficiently similar in their marginal 
effect upon the probability of conflict success. If the second 
inequality in each expression holds, then the marginal benefit 
of intervention is greater than the marginal cost of intervention 
when the opposing outside party does not intervene. This set 
of inequalities assures that the strategy profile {intervention, 
intervention} is chosen despite its sub-optimality. I expect the 
second inequalities to hold if the (geostrategic) value of allied 
success is sufficiently high and if intervention is sufficiently 
effective, on the margin, in changing the probability of 
conflict success. 
One might think of each intervening party as a conflict 
regulator (see, e.g., Amegashie and Kutsoati 2007). In this 
sense, the United Nations has the potential to act as a conflict 
“meta-regulator” by imposing sanctions on escalatory 
interveners. Such action might be desirable from Paretian and 
humanitarian perspectives when multiple interveners are (may 
become) locked in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Below, I consider a 
game in which the United Nations punishes escalatory 
intervention by imposing sanctions directly upon intervening 
parties. 
 
Table 2: Simple Intervention Game in Normal Form 
 
In the above diagram,     represents the value of a tax or 
sanction imposed upon escalatory interveners by the United 
Nations. This policy variable can potentially change the 
game’s equilibrium from a Prisoner’s Dilemma outcome to an 
efficient equilibrium outcome. The conditions for such an 
effect are as follows. 
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The first inequality in each condition is true by definition. 
It is presented, however, to provide a comparison between the 
first and third terms in each inequality. Said comparison 
assures that the strategy profile {intervention, intervention} is 
sub-optimal (i.e., a Prisoner’s Dilemma type outcome is 
possible depending on the actions of the intervening parties). 
The third term in each condition is likely to be larger than the 
corresponding first term as the magnitude of U.N. sanctions 
rises, as the unit cost of intervention increases, and as the 
marginal effectiveness of intervention decreases, and as the 
strategic value of intervention declines. The second inequality 
in each condition assures that non-intervention is chosen by 
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where 1 = Party 1, 2 = Party 2, IN = Intervention 
each party in the presence of U.N. “meta-intervention.” This 
inequality is also more likely to hold as the magnitude of U.N. 
sanctions rises. 
3. Conclusion and future research 
 
In cases of bilateral, escalatory intervention, outside parties 
that seek to decrease the cost of allied arming may greatly 
intensify a given conflict (Chang, Potter, and Sanders 2007). 
As the benefit of a conflict is essentially fixed or decreasing in 
conflict, the intensification of fighting by an intervening party 
is undesirable from human and welfare perspectives (Sanders 
2012). Herein, I study the welfare effects of bilateral, 
escalatory intervention upon intervening parties. This vantage 
point stands in contrast to a great deal of literature examining 
the effect of conflict intervention upon the primary parties to 
conflict. From this simple, game-theoretic analysis, we gain a 
greater understanding as to the nature of conflict intervention. 
Whenever there are outside parties to a conflict that are 
sufficiently symmetric, countervailing interventions may 
occur as a Prisoner’s Dilemma outcome. Thus, intervening 
parties may become worse off through their own intervention 
efforts. This result brings into further question the desirability 
of escalatory conflict intervention. We can speculate that the 
United States and Communist powers were sufficiently similar 
during the Cold War to elicit such a result. Indeed, respective 
policies of containment and expansion appear to have drawn 
the two parties into the same conflicts on multiple occasions. 
If the United Nations imposes sufficient sanctions costs upon 
intervening parties, I lastly find that United Nations “meta-
intervention” can prevent a (sub-optimal) escalating, bilateral 
intervention. 
Future research along the lines of the present study may 
seek to understand if the motivations of conflict interveners 
are different in the case of “proxy wars” than in other cases of 
intervention. A proxy war is often a (costly) demonstration of 
military ability. Unlike other cases of intervention, intervening 
parties staging a proxy war may have no vested interest in the 
welfare of the conflicted land, and this may increase the 
likelihood that conflict escalates through intervention. Indeed, 
proxy wars may be especially costly (e.g., costly beyond the 
degree of a “typical conflict”) for the inhabitants of the 
conflicted region. 
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Appendix 
 
A1: Prisoner’s Dilemma type Nash Equilibrium outcome 
(Conditions 1 & 2) 
The first inequality of condition 1 
  
  
   
   
      
   
          
The corresponding pay off (Table 1) 
    
  
   
   
      
   
          
      
  
   
   
      
   
               
(from condition 1) 
It shows the outcome (with intervention from both) is less 
than optimal (without intervention) 
The second inequality of condition 1 
      
  
   
      
  
  
   
             
It implies that the benefit of intervention is greater than the 
cost. (Choose to intervene) 
Similar analysis for condition 2. 
 
A2: Prisoner’s Dilemma outcome to an efficient equilibrium 
outcome (conditions 3 & 4) 
The first and third terms of the condition 3 
  
  
   
   
      
   
              
The corresponding payoff (Table 2) 
    
  
   
   
      
   
              
      
  
   
   
      
   
                    
It shows sub-optimal outcome than without intervention. 
The second inequality of condition 3  
  
  
   
              
            
  
   
         
It shows the cost of intervention is greater than the benefit. 
(Choose not to intervene). 
Similar analysis for condition 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
